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ABSTRACT
Under the standard competitive model, a tax change affecting workers with highly inelastic
labor supply, will lower earnings by the entire nominal employer share of the tax increase. If wages
play a motivational role but the market still clears, the range of possible outcomes is broader but
wages should still not rise if the tax is nominally divided 50/50. In contrast, because there is excess
labor (involuntary unemployment) in equilibrium, efficiency wage models resemble models in which
labor supply is perfectly elastic, and thus earnings rise by more than the worker's nominal share. The
1968, 1974 and 1979 increases in the taxable earnings base for FICA provide good opportunities to
test the models. This tax increase affected only those workers earning significantly more than the
median earnings for male full-time/year-round workers. Such workers' labor force participation is
likely to be highly inelastic. The results support models in which the motivational effects of wages
are important but cannot clearly distinguish between the efficiency wage and market-clearing
versions of those models.
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lang@bu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Labor market models can be loosely divided into those in which wages serve
only to allocate workers’ time to diﬀerent activities including jobs and those
in which wages play a wider range of roles such as motivating workers or
attracting workers with greater unobservable skills. In the former models
(see for example, Rosen, 1986), markets for all jobs clear. Any wage dif-
ferentials reﬂect productivity diﬀerences associated with the types of skills
workers bring to the job or the conditions under which they work. In con-
trast, when wages play a wider role, the market may fail to clear if the eﬀect
of wages on productivity is suﬃciently large. If so, wage diﬀerentials may
reﬂect luck or exceed those needed to compensate workers for bad working
conditions. In general, the market is eﬃcient in models in which the labor
market clears but ineﬃcient in those in which it does not.
While it is natural to focus on the extreme versions of the models — the
standard competitive model in which wages do not aﬀect productivity and
eﬃciency wage models in which the productivity eﬀects are suﬃciently large
to preclude market-clearing — there is actually a continuum of models in
which wages aﬀect productivity but the labor market clears. The focus in
t h i sp a p e rw i l lb eo nm o d e l si nw h i c ht h ew a g ec a nb ev i e w e da se n t e r i n gt h e
production function directly. Such models include theories in which higher
wages induce more eﬀort by deterring shirking (Shapiro/Stiglitz, 1984) or
increasing worker morale (Solow, 1979; Akerlof, 1984). When the produc-
tive eﬀects of wages are suﬃciently large, I will call such models eﬃciency
wage models but note that this formulation excludes some models commonly
viewed as eﬃciency wage models such as those in which higher wages reduce
vacancies (Weitzman, 1989, Lang, 1991, Montgomery, 1991).
Previous papers ask whether exogenous diﬀerences in wages generate
greater productivity (Capelli and Chauvin, 1991) or exogenous increases in
the cost of monitoring generate higher wages (Krueger, 1991) but do not
addresses whether wage diﬀerentials pay for themselves. Levine (1992) does
ﬁnd that wage diﬀerentials pay for themselves, but it is not clear that his
wage diﬀerentials can be viewed as exogenous. Finally, some papers examine
the relation between monitoring and pay, positing a negative relation under
the eﬃciency wage model. However, these papers never address the question
of what exogenous factor causes ﬁrms to choose diﬀerent combinations of
wages and supervision. There is also a large literature on interindustry wage
diﬀerentials that asks whether the pattern of diﬀerentials is consistent with
market-clearing (Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz
and Summers, 1989; Murphy and Topel, 1987; Gibbons and Katz, 1992).
1The approach in this paper is quite diﬀerent. I rely on the comparative
statics of a change in tax law to distinguish between the two models. The
argument is quite simple. Under the standard competitive model, if a tax
change aﬀects a group of workers with highly inelastic labor supply, their
earnings will fall by essentially the entire nominal employer share of the tax
increase. Allowing the wage to play a motivational role but maintaining the
market-clearing assumption broadens the range of possible outcomes. Given
a reasonable estimate of the elasticity of demand, earnings could fall from
anywhere between 0 and more than 100% of the employer’s nominal share
but would not rise. In contrast, because there is excess labor (involuntary
unemployment) in equilibrium, eﬃciency wage models function very much
like models in which the supply of labor is perfectly elastic, and thus earnings
rise by more than the worker’s nominal share.
I argue that the 1968, 1974 and 1979 increases in the taxable earnings
base for FICA provide good opportunities to test the models. This tax
increase aﬀected only those workers earning signiﬁcantly more than the me-
dian earnings for male full-time/year-round workers. Such workers’ labor
force participation is likely to have been highly inelastic. In addition, low
earnings workers did not experience this tax increase.
The results are supportive of models in which the motivational eﬀects of
wages are important but cannot clearly distinguish between the eﬃciency
wage and market-clearing versions of those models.
2T h e o r y
Until 1991, FICA taxes could be summarized by two parameters, the tax
rate (formally split between employer and employee) and the earnings base.
Taxes were levied on all earnings up to the earnings base. Thereafter, no
taxes were collected.1 The history of FICA taxes between 1967 and 1980 is
given in Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, between 1973 and 1977, the FICA tax
rate was constant at 5.85% or a little more than 11% if one takes account
of both the employer and employee shares. During this same period, the
earnings base was roughly constant relative to earnings in the economy,
1There is a slight complexity in that the worker’s share of the tax is applied to earnings
up to the earnings base in that year regardless of where the income was earned. The
earnings base is applied separately to each employer so that a if a worker had more than
one employer in the course of the year, the employers’ share could be applied collectively
to more than the earnings base.
2ﬂuctuating around 1.13 times the median earnings for male full-time/year-
round workers. In 1978, the tax rate was raised to 6.05% or 11.36% of full
earnings including the employer share and, in 1979, to 11.55% including the
employer share.
More signiﬁcantly, in 1979 the earnings base jumped to 1.35 times me-
dian earnings for male full-time/year-round workers. For a worker earning
$22,900 in 1979, this represents an increase in payroll taxes equal to approx-
imately 2.6% of earnings including the employer’s share. This dwarfs the
0.19 percentage point increase in the tax rate.
Note that an increase in the earnings base has no direct eﬀect on workers
who would have earned less than the old earnings base. Workers who would
have earned more than the new earnings base, experience an increase in
a pure employment tax and thus only an income eﬀect unless the shift is
suﬃcient for them to jump to the lower segment on the budget line. Finally,
for workers who would have earned less than the new base but more than
the old base, there is both an income and a substitution eﬀect as well as the
possibility that they will jump to the lower segment of the budget line.
In what follows, we will concentrate on workers who would have earned
more than the new earnings base. We begin by treating increasing the
earnings base as an increase in a pure employment tax, as it is for high-
earnings workers, and investigate its eﬀect on wages under diﬀerent models.
Since the markets for diﬀerent types of workers are not independent, this
will require a fuller justiﬁcation which we provide later in this section.
We begin by examining the eﬀect on wages of an employment tax when
hours and other job characteristics are ﬁxed, workers are homogeneous and
coverage is universal. Moreover, we treat labor force participation as per-
fectly inelastic since we are modeling the behavior of high-earnings workers
who typically are strongly attached to the labor market.
Subsequently we address a number of issues — 1) endogenous hours/job
quality; 2) substitutability among diﬀerent types of workers when coverage
is not universal; 3) the endogeneity of the tax to the labor supply decision.
2.1 Wage Eﬀects of an Employment Tax with Exogenous
Hours
We begin with a simple model that includes the generic Solow (1979) eﬃ-
ciency wage model as a special case.
For the representative ﬁrm, we have
π = f(e(w)L) − (w + T)L (1)
3where e is eﬃciency units of labor and T is the employment tax. Maximizing
with respect to L and w gives the familiar ﬁrst-order-conditions
f0e = w + T (2)
f0e0 ≤ 1. (3)
When (3) holds with equality, we have the canonical eﬃciency wage model.
When it does not, we have a market clearing model but in which wages
increase productivity if e0 > 0. We begin with the market-clearing model.
2.1.1 Wage Eﬀects with Market-Clearing






where g = f0−1 and is the demand for eﬀective labor units. L is ﬁxed since
labor supply is perfectly inelastic, we can fully diﬀerentiate the right-hand-















εd(1 − εs) − εs
(6)
where εd and εs are the elasticities of demand for and supply of eﬀective labor
units. Recall that hours and participation are ﬁxed. It is the possibility of
a change in eﬀort that permits supply to be elastic.




and we have the standard result that when labor supply is perfectly inelastic,
labor bears the entire burden of the payroll tax.
At the other extreme, where the incentive eﬀects of higher wages are
almost suﬃcient to induce the payment of an eﬃciency wage, εs → 1 so that
dw
dT → εd. Given that the payroll tax is nominally levied equally on worker
and employer, if εd = −.5, we would not observe any shifting of the tax.
42.1.2 Wage Eﬀects in the Eﬃciency Wage Model
So far we have assumed that the eﬃciency eﬀect of a wage increase is dom-
inated by its direct cost so that inequality (3) is strict. There is a disconti-
nuity in the wage eﬀect when we shift to an eﬃciency wage world in which
both ﬁrst-order conditions hold with equality. In this case we have
e0(w + T)
e
= εs =1 , (7)
or in other words, the wage is set at the point at which the elasticity of eﬀort
with respect to the wage equals 1.









where d(.)/dw is the derivative of the left-hand-side of (7) with respect to
w. This derivative must be negative by the second-order condition.
In other words, the after-tax wage received by workers rises. The intu-
ition is that when the per worker employment tax rises, ﬁrms will want to
reduce the number of workers and require more intensive work from each
remaining worker. In the competitive model, because labor force participa-
tion is perfectly inelastic, the equilibrium impact is on earnings not on the
number of workers employed. However, in the eﬃciency wage model, the
excess supply of labor means that the model operates as if the supply of
labor were perfectly elastic. If there were no change in the level of eﬀort
required of workers, the wage would not change. However, because eﬀort
increases, so does the wage.
It must be recognized that the Solow model is not applicable to all eﬃ-
ciency wage models. In particular, recruiting models, in many ways variants
of search models, do not fall within this framework.
Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, the Solow model has the rather odd charac-
teristic that the wage is independent of productivity in the range that the
eﬃciency wage condition is binding. As productivity increases, the wage
remains constant, the quantity of labor demanded increases and unemploy-
ment falls. The natural way to extend the model is to allow productivity to
depend on some reference wage which depends on the wage, the prevailing
wage and the level of unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). For mod-
els in which eﬀort depends on the unemployment rate as well as the wage
(e = e(w,u)), the analysis can be more complicated. In the simplest case,
d2e/dwdu =0 , and the analysis is unchanged. Pisauro (1994) analyzes an
5eﬃciency wage model in which u aﬀects eﬀort and obtains similar results.
In the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, wages could fall somewhat in response to a
t a xl e v i e de n t i r e l yo nt h ee m p l o y e r . 2
2.2 Extensions and Issues
2.2.1 Wage Eﬀects with Endogenous Job Quality/Hours
We now consider the case where the tax may alter characteristics of the job
such as hours or working conditions. In the discussion, we refer to h,t h ej o b
characteristic as hours, but, in fact, the analysis applies to any characteristic.
In this section we limit ourselves to the market-clearing model since adding
job characteristics does not substantively alter the eﬃciency-wage results.
We rewrite the production function so that the number of eﬃciency units
provided by a worker depends on hours worked as well as the wage. The
market wage depends on hours required by the employer. So that (1) now
becomes
π = f(e(w,h)L) − (w(h)+T)L. (9)
For simplicity assume that utility is separable in leisure and wages so that
U(w,h)=u(w) − v(h),u 0 > 0,v0 > 0,u 00 < 0,v00 > 0.
By the usual argument, eﬃcient contracting ensures that the marginal wage





where uh and uw are the marginal disutility of labor and the marginal utility
of consumption.
2It seems natural to write e = e(
w
g(u)w∗) where g
0 < 0 and w
∗ = w in equilibrium. This
eﬀort function would arise if for example the worker compared the value of employment
with the value of unemployment with some expectation of reemployment after becoming






where in equilibrium w = w
∗. Note that in the absence of taxes, this model implies that ex-
ogenous increases in productivity raise wages and that the unemployment rate is constant.
Stability of the equilibrium requires that the derivative of the l.h.s. of the equation with
respect to w be negative. Applying the implicit-function theorem therefore establishes
that
dw





dT . Without fully modelling unemployment, we
cannot make strong statements about
du
dT but in most plausible models, it will be positive,
implying that
dw
dT > 0 as in the canonical model.
6Maximizing (9) with respect to L, h,a n dw gives
f0e = w(h)+T (11)
f0eh = w0 (12)
f0ew ≤ 1 (13)
with the inequality being strict in the market-clearing case.
Substituting (10) into (12) and fully diﬀerentiating establishes that w
and h move in opposite directions.3 This is not surprising. Recall that w
is total, not hourly, wage compensation. If both consumption and leisure
are normal goods, then when compensation rises, workers take part of the
increase in the form of greater consumption and part in the form of leisure.
To ﬁnd dw
dT , we use (4) but recognize that e now depends on h as well as w.


























The additional term in the denominator shows that if labor demand is in-
elastic, the hours increase in response to reduced earnings lowers earnings
even further. By deﬁnition, inelastic labor demand means that increasing
supply lowers total payments to labor.
In short, given consensus elasticities of demand above -1, allowing for job
characteristics such as hours or safety increases our expectation that under
the market-clearing hypothesis much or all of the burden of an increase in
the earnings base will be borne by the workers.4
2.2.2 The Payroll Tax is an Impure Employment Tax
We have modeled the FICA tax as a pure employment tax. In fact, while
a small change in labor supply does not aﬀect the tax, it is possible for
a worker to reduce the tax by a suﬃcient reduction in labor supply. The
eﬀect of recognizing this complexity is most easily analyzed if we model the







4Note that the wage change is not even an approximate measure of the distribution of
burden between the ﬁrm and worker since workers also adjust eﬀort.
7tax as being collected from the worker so that labor supply depends on the
after-tax hourly wage.
If whi
s <Y ∗ where Y ∗ is maximum taxable earnings, worker i’s labor





where t is the tax rate and θ is a vector of factors that determine tastes for
leisure and Y a
i is nonlabor income.
If whs




i − tY ∗). (16)
Of course, this kinked budget line implies a nonconvexity. The solution
to (15) may give whs
i <Y∗ while at the same time the solution to (16) gives
whs
i >Y∗. In this case, we need to check the utility level associated with
the two solutions and choose the solution with the higher utility. In the
extreme case, the individual may be indiﬀerent between the two in which
case a small change in the tax structure can dramatically alter labor supply.
It is therefore critical to the analysis so far that increasing the earnings
base not lead to large reductions in labor supply by a substantial number of
workers. In the empirical work below, we examine the importance of such
shifts.
2.2.3 BeneﬁtI n c r e a s e s
The increase in the earnings base also raises the base on which retirement
and disability beneﬁts are earned. This beneﬁt increase partially oﬀsets the
tax increase so that the full income from working falls by less than the tax
increase. Of course, the health insurance component of FICA is not aﬀected
by the earnings base increase. Because of the complexity of the social secu-
rity beneﬁt formula, the value of the increased OASDI beneﬁt varies across
individuals. Still, because of the very nonlinear relation between payments
and beneﬁts, most of those earning above the new cutoﬀ will not recoup the
added taxes. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) estimate very high marginal so-
cial security tax rates for high earnings workers, and their estimates do not
include the health and disability components of FICA. Their results show
that for high-earnings workers, the marginal beneﬁts of increased social se-
curity contributions are small. Given the complexity of the social security
system, it is not obvious that workers perceive any direct relation between
their payments and their beneﬁts.
8Of course, beneﬁti n c r e a s e ss h o u l db eo ﬀset 1 for 1 by wage decreases.
Therefore, to the extent that the tax increase is partially oﬀset by increased
beneﬁts, this reinforces our expectation under the competitive model that
high-earnings workers will see their after-tax earnings fall by the full amount
of the tax increase but could provide an alternative explanation for the
failure of the prediction of the eﬃciency wage model.
2.2.4 Substitution Between Low- and High-Earnings Workers
S of a rw eh a v et r e a t e dt h et a xi n c r e a s ea sa ﬀecting all workers. If the market
for workers above the earnings base were separate from the market for other
workers, we would be fully justiﬁed in this choice. However, these markets
are surely interrelated, and we must consider how this aﬀects our predictions,
particularly for the market-clearing model.
If wage diﬀerentials reﬂect productivity diﬀerences among workers, labor
demand is likely to be highly elastic. Workers with one set of skills are likely
to be close substitutes for workers with a similar set of skills. In the extreme
case when worker skill can be measured in eﬀective labor units, the demand
for a particular skill level will be perfectly elastic. In this case, wages of
high-earnings workers would have to fall, relative to other workers, by at
least the amount of the tax, and more if the wage decline made them less
productive. More generally, the substituting of low earners for high-earners
will raise the earnings of the former and further reduce the earnings of the
latter.
If wage diﬀerentials were primarily compensating diﬀerentials for job
characteristics, reducing wages in high wage/unpleasant jobs would cause
an outﬂow of workers from the high wage sector. Wage diﬀerentials would
have to adjust to leave workers indiﬀerent among the diﬀerent types of jobs
oﬀered in equilibrium. However, there is little evidence to support the view
that most wage diﬀerentials are compensating diﬀerentials for bad job char-
acteristics (Brown, 1980). So the case that must concern us is where most
wage diﬀerentials reﬂect productivity diﬀerences but some small part of the
diﬀerence reﬂects compensating diﬀerentials which is identical to the case
of endogenous hours discussed above. The sole caveat is that, as in the case
of labor supply, because of the nonconvexity of the budget set, there is a
theoretical possibility that such a worker will jump from a high-earnings job
with undesirable characteristics to a much lower-earnings job with better
characteristics.
92.3 Summary of Theoretical Predictions
If we allow wages to have eﬃciency eﬀects, the market-clearing model per-
mits a broad range of predictions regarding the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
FICA earnings base on the earnings of high-earnings workers. Even when
the labor force participation of high-earners is perfectly inelastic, high earn-
ers may experience earnings declines that exceed the tax increase if labor
demand is very elastic and incentive eﬀects are important. On the other
hand, if incentive eﬀects are important and demand is relatively inelastic,
the earnings of high-earners might fall by only about half of the tax. Given
that the FICA tax is nominally divided equally between worker and em-
ployer, this implies no change in nominal wages.
In contrast, when the incentive eﬀe c t so fw a g e sa r es u ﬃciently large
to generate an eﬃciency wage equilibrium, the tax increase should have a
positive eﬀect on the pre-tax wage if there is no associated beneﬁti n c r e a s e
from the tax increase.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d s
If we could randomly assign workers to separate markets with diﬀerent earn-
ings bases, measuring the earnings eﬀect of in increase in the earnings base
would be easy. Unfortunately such an experiment is not available.
Our approach is to examine earnings increases for a group of high-
earnings workers.5 If workers’ earnings fall due to a tax increase, such
workers should experience unusually small increases in years in which the
earnings base increases. Conversely, if ﬁrms must pay higher wages in re-
sponse to the tax increase, such workers should get unusually large increases.
(Recall that the tax is nominally split equally between worker and ﬁrm.)
As shown in Table 1, the FICA tax rate was constant within each of the
following sets of years: 1967-1968, 1969-1970, 1971-1972, 1973-77, and 1979-
80. The March 1972 and 1973 and the March 1976 and 1977 ﬁles cannot be
5While it might appear that it is possible to look simply at how wage levels are aﬀected
by changes in the earnings base, this is not the case. For example, we might look at
whether the wages of workers who earn at least $30,000 are higher or lower when the
earnings base is $30,000 than when it is $20,000. However, the increase in the base aﬀects
the set of workers who earn at least $30,000. The models make no predictions about
wages conditional on being above some cut-oﬀ. For example, suppose that raising the
earnings base increases the earnings of all workers earning above $30,000 by $1,000 but
some workers who would have earned less than $30,000 earn between $30,000 and $31,000.
The average wage conditional on earnings $30,000 could go up or down and would certainly
go up by less than the true increase of $1,000 for high-earning workers.
10matched so that we cannot examine the 1971-72 and 1975-76 periods. The
largest increase in the earnings base occurred between 1978 and 1979 when
it rose from 113% to 135% of median earnings for male full-time/year-round
workers. While the tax rate did increase over that period, the increase was
quite small, from 6.05% to 6.13%. We treat this as an additional year with
no change in the tax rate.
We therefore have the following potential “experimental years”
1. 1967-68 when the base rose by 10 percentage points relative to median
earnings.
2. 1973-74 when the base rose by 14 percentage points.
3. 1978-79 when the base rose by 32 percentage points.
These experimental years can be compared with the four control years:
1. 1969-70 when the base fell by 5 percentage points.
2. 1974-75 when the base was constant.
3. 1976-77 when the base fell by one percentage point.
4. 1979-80 when the base rose by 4 percentage points6
Hours data and therefore hourly wages are available only starting in
1976. Thus the last experiment is the only one for which we can use wage
comparisons rather than annual earnings comparisons.
The theory as developed requires that the earnings base increase not be
oﬀset by a beneﬁt increase. In each year that the earnings base was raised,
there was an automatic beneﬁt increase associated with that increase. After
1974, primary insurance amounts (PIA) were indexed. However, in the
earlier years there were beneﬁt increases that could be problematic. The
PIA increased by about 13% in February 1968 and 11% in June 1974. Given
t h eh i g hr a t eo fi n ﬂation in 1974 and 1975, the latter increase generates close
to a zero real increase in both years. The earlier years are somewhat more
problematic since there is a real increase in 1968 and a smaller but real
decrease in 1970. Since high-earners with high PIAs would beneﬁtm o r e
from the increase, this will bias our results towards ﬁnding a bigger earnings
decrease in response to the 1967-68 base increase.
The theories apply to workers who would have earned more than the
new earnings bases even in the absence of a change and who continue to
do so after the increase. Our inability to identify such workers directly is
6Table 1 compares the earnings base to median earnings. We could compare changes
in the earnings base to changes in the consumer price index. For most of the years we
consider, this would not generate any substantive change. The real change in the base
from 1979 to 1980 is reduced to approximately 0 and the real change in the base from
1973 to 1974 is reduced to about 9 percentage points. The remaining changes are minor.
The changes are even more modest if we index using the implicit GDP deﬂator.
11as i g n i ﬁcant problem. We employ a number of strategies to address this
problem.
Consider two pairs of years, one (denoted years 1 and 2) in which the
real earnings base remains constant at $20,000 across the two years and one
(denoted years 3 and 4) in which it rises from $20,000 to $30,000. Given
our strategy of examining earnings growth, we would like to identify workers
who would have earned more than $30,000 in year 2 and in year 4, regardless
of whether the earnings base were $20,000 or $30,000. In fact, in year 2
we observe their earnings only at the lower earnings base while in year 4,
we observe them only at the higher earnings base. If the earnings base
had no eﬀect on who earns at least $30,000, this would not be a problem.
Unfortunately, theory suggests that the earnings base should aﬀect who
is in this class. The severity of this problem is an empirical issue which
is addressed below. If the earnings base has only a small eﬀect on the
composition of the set of people earning at least $30,000, then relying on
earnings in years 2 and 4 to identify the workers in whom we are interested
will be a good strategy.
If the earnings base change has a large eﬀect on who earns more than the
new earnings base, relying on earnings in years 2 and 4 entails a signiﬁcant
endogeneity problem. We can avoid this problem by using year 1 and year
3 earnings to identify workers. Thus we can examine earnings growth for
workers who earned at least $30,000 in those years. This approach avoids
the endogeneity issue since workers in both years 1 and 3 were subject to
the lower earnings base but is likely to generate much more misclassiﬁcation.
Workers whose earnings are unusually low in one year will have earnings that
are predictably higher the next — a beginning assistant professor drawing
salary for only four or six months may know that she will earn more than
the earnings base the following year. Similarly, workers with unusually high
earnings expect to fall below the earnings base the following year.
Reactions to early versions of this paper suggest that most economists
are more concerned by the endogeneity issue than by the misclassiﬁcation
issue. We use both approaches but rely more heavily on classiﬁcations based
on ﬁrst-year earnings.
In each case, we measure the earnings eﬀect of the earnings base increase
by comparing earnings increases for high-earnings workers in the year the
base changed with the earnings increase in control years. We classify workers
as being high-wage on the basis of their earnings relative to earnings for the
median year-round/full-time worker. When we examine the eﬀect of the
1968 earnings base increase, we look at earnings increases for all workers
earning at least 102% of median earnings for male year-round/full time
12workers in 1967, 1969, 1974, 1976 and 1979. We ask whether real earnings
increases for these workers are higher or lower from 1967 to 1968 than they
are in each of the other four years. Similarly, when we examine the eﬀect
of the 1974 earnings base increase, we examine workers who earned at least
111% of median earnings for male year-round/full time workers in 1973,
1969, 1974, 1976 and 1979 and for the eﬀect of the 1979 increase, we look
at real earnings increases for workers earning at least 135% of this median
in 1978 and each of the four control years.
Note that whether we classify high-earnings workers on the basis of ﬁrst
or second-period earnings, the earnings increase will include a transitory
component. The earnings increase is given by
∆wi = wit +  it − wit−1 −  it−1
where w are the permanent components of earnings and the   are transitory
(one year) components of earnings or measurement error. When the sample
is drawn based on reported ﬁrst-year earnings, we have
E(∆wi)=wit − wit−1 − E( it−1|wit−1 +  it−1 >Y∗)
where Y ∗ is the new earnings base. We expect our estimates ∆wi to be
biased downwards relative to the change in the permanent component of
earnings. The sample will overrepresent people with high transitory ﬁrst-
year earnings. Conversely, when we draw the sample on the basis of second-
year earnings, the sample will overrepresent people with high transitory
second-year earnings, and our estimates ∆wi will be biased upwards.
The critical identifying assumption is that the bias depends only on the
earnings level used for the sample cut-oﬀ and not on whether the earnings
base changed that year. If so,
E(∆w|base_change) − E(∆w|no_change)
= ∆w|base_change − ∆w|no_change
+E( it−1|wit−1 +  it−1 >Y ∗&base_change)
−E( it−1|wit−1 +  it−1 >Y ∗&no_change)
=( ∆w|base_change) − (∆w|no_change).
While our sample is quite large since it draws on microdata from seven
March CPS surveys, as emphasized in Donald and Lang (2000), as the num-
ber of observations per year gets large, the problem eﬀectively reduces to
one in which there are seven data points corresponding to the seven years
13we study. In each of these years, there is a wide variety of forces aﬀecting
wages — the Vietnam war, oil shocks, monetary and ﬁscal policy, etc. Our
experimental and control years both contain relatively high and relatively
low inﬂation years, boom years and recession years, years of war and years
of relative peace. There is no obvious reason that wage increases would
tend to be higher or lower for high-earnings workers, especially relative to
the median, in years in which the earnings base changed.
However, as in any case in which there are eﬀectively only seven obser-
vations the probability of a random correlation between unmeasured factors
and the variable of interest cannot be treated as zero (as it would be as-
ymptotically). Our degree of conﬁdence must reﬂect the limitations of our
sample. In order to make this explicit, our estimation approach follows that
suggested in Donald and Lang. For each pair of years, we calculate the
median earnings increase (ct) for workers with earnings above the earnings
base. As noted above, the median increase should not be given a struc-
tural interpretation. The c coeﬃcients will tend to be positive when we
base the sample on second-period earnings and negative when we base it
on ﬁrst-period earnings since we expect individuals with high wages to have
experienced high wage growth. We use the median rather than the mean,
because it is important to avoid spurious sources of diﬀerences in the b c0s. In
particular, annual earnings are top-coded at $50,000 (far greater than the
earnings base), a problem that becomes more serious over time and there
is undoubtedly considerable measurement error in wage growth which can
diminish the robustness of the mean.
In the second stage, the estimated medians, the b c’s, are used as depen-
dent variables in a regression of the following form:
b ct = a0 + a1year base changedt + ut. (17)
The regression compares the earnings growth of high-earners in the “exper-
imental” year with the average of the earnings growth of high-earners in the
control years. It recognizes that for each of the experiments there are only
ﬁve data points and three degrees of freedom.
Because diﬀerences in wage growth across years might reﬂect changes in
the composition of the labor force, we also estimate the following equation
wageit − wageit−1 = XiBt + ct + eit (18)
for each pair of years. Again the sample is restricted to the high-earnings
group. We regress the estimated c’s using (17).
14As before, equation (18) has no structural interpretation. Since we rely
on quantile regression, it simply provides the best linear prediction of median
period t wage growth conditional on period t-1 (or period t) wages being
high and other individual characteristics.
However, there is no reason to expect these conditional means to diﬀer
across years unless changes in the FICA tax or other factors change the
wage structure. If FICA tax changes lower the relative wages of high wage
workers,we would expect this to be reﬂected in the coeﬃcients of equation
(18).
Eissa (1995) tests for eﬀects of the 1986 income tax reform by compar-
ing labor supply changes for women with very high family incomes (who
should be aﬀected by the tax reform) with those with somewhat lower fam-
ily incomes who should not be. As a further test of the eﬀect of the FICA
tax change, we mimic this strategy. We estimate the equivalent of (18) for
workers with earnings below the old earnings base for whom there should
be no eﬀect of the increased earnings base. In the second stage, we use
the diﬀerence between b ct for high-earnings and low-earnings workers as our
dependent variable in (17). This “diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences” strategy will
be superior to the simple diﬀerences approach if there are common shocks
to earnings increases for both high and low-earnings workers and which are
not captured by trends in median earnings for which we do not otherwise
control. This approach also allows us to free the B’s to vary across pairs of
years.
The data are drawn from matched March annual demographic supple-
ments to the Current Population Survey. The March supplement provides
information on earnings the previous year. The data used here are from
the Unicon CPS ﬁl e s . F o re a c hp a i ro fy e a r s ,w em a t c ht h eﬁrst four ro-
tation groups from the ﬁrst year with the last four rotation groups from
the second year using the identiﬁers for those years that allow matching
of interview location.7 The samples are then matched on the basis of ex-
act agreement on race, sex and age (adjusted by one year). Approximately
70% of the potential sample is matched in each year. The sample is lim-
ited to workers with positive earnings in both years. Additional restrictions
7The Current Population Survey samples residences for four month, skips these resi-
dences for eight months and then samples them again for four more months before dropping
them from the sample. Thus each location is included in eight “rotation groups” with
the last four occurring one year after the ﬁrst four. Since the survey relies on a sample
of residences rather than households, the respondents in the two years may diﬀer. By
matching on exact age, sex and race, we avoid most mismatches. Undoubtedly, response
and coding error results in some real matches being missed.
15on earnings are described in the presentation of the results. For example,
when we study the eﬀect of the 1968 tax increase on high-earnings workers
and deﬁne high-earnings by ﬁrst-period earnings, the sample is limited to
workers who earned at least 102% of median earnings in the ﬁrst year of
each two-year pair.
To calculate real wages we index wages bym e d i a ne a r n i n g sf o rm a l ef u l l -
time/year-round workers rather than the more conventional consumer price
index. This strategy sidesteps a number of issues about the appropriateness
of diﬀerent measures of real wages. In particular, we do not have to address
issues of anticipated versus unanticipated inﬂation. In addition, by indexing
to a measure of median earnings our approach is, in many ways, analogous
to the popular diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach. By indexing wages to
median earnings, we are, in eﬀect, asking whether relative to the median
worker wages for high earnings workers rise more or less in years in which
the earnings base increases. It is worth noting that while the instability of
inﬂation in this period is a disadvantage, one advantage of the period is that,
because of the relatively high inﬂation, nominal wage rigidity is much less
of a concern than it might be in other periods. In periods of low-inﬂation,
even if the full cost of the tax were shifted to workers in the long run, we
might ﬁnd little shifting in the short run, because ﬁrms are reluctant to cut
wages. However, during this period, full-shifting is consistent with nominal
wage increases.
Equations (18) and (17) can be estimated separately for each of the three
“experiments.” However, the three “experiments” are not really indepen-
dent. The ﬁrst-stage results for each of the four control years are presumably
correlated across experiments even though each ﬁrst-stage is estimated sep-
arately using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of high and low earners. Therefore, we
cannot treat the three estimates of a1 as independent.
We combine the three experiments in the following way which again
follows the procedure proposed by Donald and Lang. We take the ﬁfteen
median wage changes (ﬁve for each of three experiments) and regress these
on year and experiment dummies to produce seven year eﬀects. We then
calculate the value of the tax change in that year. The one-side tax change
for high-earnings workers is approximately $76 (1979 dollars) in 1968, $155
in 1974 and $323 in 1979 and is zero in each of the control years. We then
regress the seven year eﬀects on the one-sided tax change. If wages fall to
fully oﬀset the nominal tax increase on employers, the coeﬃcient from this
regression should be about -1 and be about 1 if wages rise to fully oﬀset the
nominal tax on workers.
164R e s u l t s
We begin by asking whether the tax change has a measurable eﬀect on the
relation between being a high-earnings worker in the ﬁrst period and being a
high-earnings worker in the second period. The results are shown in Table 2.
As can be seen relatively few workers who earned less than the real earnings
base in their ﬁrst year earned more than the earnings base in their second
year. The highest proportion of such workers is the 7.5% of workers who
earned less than the 1968 earnings base in 1967 but more than this base in
1968. At the other extreme, only 2.2% of workers who earned less than the
1979 earnings base in 1974 earned more than this amount in 1975.
Movement from being measured as above the earnings base in one year
to below the earnings base in the following year is more common. Fully
26.5% of workers who reported earning more than the 1979 earnings base in
1979 reported earning less than that base in 1980. In contrast, only 8.7% of
those earning less than the 1968 base in 1967 earned less than that base in
1968.
Perhaps the most important result is that there is no evidence that
increasing the earnings base causes signiﬁcant numbers of workers to re-
duce their earnings so that they no longer earn more than the new earnings
base. If anything, workers seem somewhat more likely to shift into the high-
earnings region and less likely to leave the high-earnings region in years when
the base is raised. Although not the central focus of our approach, this is
consistent with ﬁrms adjusting wages to oﬀset much of the worker share of
the tax increase.
Table 3 presents the results of conducting each of the “experiments”
independently. The years in which the earnings base changed are marked in
bold. The top half of the table shows the median earnings change in each
year for workers who earn more than the higher real earnings base in the
ﬁrst year. Not surprisingly, the median changes are all negative. Workers
who in one year report high earnings, frequently have lower earnings the
next year because their ﬁrst-year earnings are inﬂated by a combination of
measurement error and transitory earnings.
It is immediately apparent that the coeﬃcients are highest (lowest in
absolute value) in the years in which the earnings base increased. In each
of the three cases, earnings declines for this group are substantially lower in
the experimental year than in the four control years. Because the changes
for control years are correlated across experiments, there is no simple way to
combine the results from the three experiments. We can, however, consider
two extremes — 0 correlation of control years across experiments and perfect
17correlation. In the former case, the probability of the relative wage increase
being highest in the experimental year is .2 for each experiment and .008
for all three experiments or .016 for a two-tailed test. When the correlation
is perfect, we can ask what the probability is that all three experiments





35, again signiﬁcant at the .05 level for a one-tailed
test and at the .06 level for a two-tailed test. Thus, the results strongly
suggest that the eﬀect of the earnings base increase is to raise the earnings
of high-earnings workers.
The bottom half of the table addresses this comparison more formally.
Each row is based on an analysis of ﬁve “ﬁrst-stage” estimates. Following
Donald and Lang (2000), we treat the ﬁve ﬁrst-stage estimates as observa-
tions of the dependent variable and regress the median on a constant term
and a dummy variable for the experimental year. The resulting t-statistic
is distributed as t with 3 degrees of freedom. Thus the critical values for a
two-tailed test are 2.353 (.1 level) and 3.182 (.05 level).
The ﬁrst row tests whether the diﬀerence between the median earnings
change in the experimental year and the control years is statistically signif-
icant. The diﬀerence ranges from 313 for the 1979 change to 434 for the
1974 change, but each diﬀerence is measured with a large standard error.
For the 1968 and 1974 changes we can reject at the .05 level the hypothe-
sis that the tax has no eﬀect on workers’ earnings while we can reject this
hypothesis at the .1 level for the 1979 change. Recall that the FICA tax is
nominally applied equally to worker and ﬁrm. Thus (if we ignore changes in
hours and other working conditions) a ﬁnding of no eﬀect on earnings would
essentially imply equal sharing of the tax. The results are consistent with
ﬁrms increasing wages by more than the worker share of the tax, strongly
suggest that wages rise in response to the tax and very strongly reject the
hypothesis that wages fall due to the tax increase.
The second row of the lower panel of Table 3 is similar to the row above
it but selects the sample on the basis of earnings in the second period. As
discussed above, this reduces errors due to misclassifying workers on the
basis of transitory ﬁrst-period earnings but may be subject to endogeneity
problems if the increase aﬀects who becomes a high-earnings worker. The
results are similar, in terms of both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance,
to those obtained when the sample is determined on the basis of ﬁrst-period
earnings.
To avoid some of the problems associated with dividing the sample on
the basis of ﬁrst- or second-period earnings, we use a probit equation to
predict whether workers will earn more than the higher earnings base in the
18second period. The explanatory variables are real ﬁrst-period earnings, a
dummy variable for being above the higher earnings base in the ﬁrst period
and a set of demographic variables (age, race and ethnicity, education, lives
in an MSA, marital status, sex, census state, number of children under 18).
The sample was limited to the control years. We then obtain a predicted
probability of earnings above the higher earnings base in the second year
and use this probability to weight the earnings change. The ﬁrst-stage es-
timates are the median weighted earnings change. The third row shows the
results of regressing this estimate on a dummy variable for the experimental
year. Again the precise sample selection method has little eﬀect on either
magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance.
Over the period 1968 - 1980, there were signiﬁcant shifts in the age, edu-
cation and sex composition of the labor force. While the experimental years
are spread throughout this period, it is possible that some of the experimen-
tal eﬀect is actually capturing the change in labor force composition. To
control for this, we used median regression in which the real wage change
was regressed on year dummies and the controls listed in the previous para-
graph. As shown in the fourth line, adding the controls has a very modest
eﬀect on the magnitude of the estimated eﬀects but increases the standard
errors noticeably. While it is still possible to reject the hypothesis that earn-
ings fell by the entire amount of the tax increases, it is no longer as evident
that earnings rose.
W em i g h tb ec o n c e r n e di ft h er e s u l t sw e r eb e i n gd r i v e nb yv e r yh i g h -
earnings workers. Therefore in the ﬁfth row, we restrict the sample to work-
ers with real ﬁrst-period earnings between the higher earnings base and that
base plus $5000. Again the results do no change substantively.
Perhaps the greatest concern is that somehow the results so far capture
something else that is happening in the economy. While we have attempted
to mimic a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator by indexing wages to the wage
of the median male year-round/full-time worker, it is possible that this nor-
malization is imperfect. One way of addressing this concern is by comparing
outcomes for high-earnings workers with outcomes for low-earnings workers.
T h el a s tt w or o w so ft a b l e3p r o v i d ed i ﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of
earnings growth. In the penultimate row, the high-earnings sample is re-
stricted as in the previous row and the low-earnings sample is restricted to
those earning between $5000 below the lower earnings base and that earn-
ings base. In the last row the high-earnings sample is unrestricted and the
comparison sample consists of those earning less than the lower earnings
base.
While all of the estimates remain positive, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
19estimates are lower in magnitude and fall short of signiﬁcance at conventional
levels. The reductions in magnitude and signiﬁcance are particularly large
when the samples are restricted. Nevertheless, we can reject full shifting to
workers in all three years and cannot reject full shifting to ﬁrms when we use
the restricted sample. Thus while the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates
indicate a need for caution, they support the interpretation derived when
we use the simple diﬀerences.
M o r e o v e r ,i ts h o u l db er e m e m b e r e dt h a tw ew o u l dn o te x p e c tt h e“ c o n -
trol” group in the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences to be unaﬀected by the policy
change. Some workers who earn less than the lower cutoﬀ in the year be-
fore the policy change, will nevertheless earn more than the new cutoﬀ after
the policy change. Thus some workers who are classiﬁed as unaﬀected by
the policy are misclassiﬁed. As a consequence, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate should be less the other estimates.
In essence, with misclassiﬁcation, the slope of the regression of real in-
come in the second year on real income in the ﬁrst year should be steeper in
years in which the earnings base increased. In practice, it is impossible to
distinguish the tax explanation from other explanations for a steeper slope.8
However, there is no obvious reason other than the tax eﬀect, that the slope
should be steeper in precisely the years that the earnings base was raised.
We do not report the results using hourly wages. Recall that there are
only three years for which hourly wages are available. The coeﬃcients are
uniformly positive but, not surprisingly given only one degree of freedom,
are very imprecise.
As discussed above, it is possible to combine the three experiments by
ﬁrst deriving seven “year eﬀects" from the three experiments and then re-
gressing these year eﬀects on a measure of the magnitude of the tax change
for those with earnings above the earnings base. The ﬁrst line of table 4
reports the results of this estimation for the base model in table 3. The
coeﬃcient from this regression is 1.20 which implies that wages rise by more
than the tax increase on workers as predicted by the eﬃciency wage model.
However, given that there are only ﬁve degrees of freedom (seven observa-
tions minus two parameters), the conﬁdence interval is quite large so that
we cannot reject models in which the market clears but the wage has impor-
tant incentive eﬀects. The extreme model in which there are no incentive
8In principle, we could estimate an equation in which the second-period wage depended
on ﬁrst-period income and the probability that the worker would be a high-earnings worker
in the second period (which would itself by a nonlinear function of ﬁrst period earnings.
By imposing restrictions on the functional form, we could distinguish the two eﬀects. In
practice, the resulting standard errors are so large as to make the exercise uninformative.
20eﬀects and workers earnings rise by the full amount of the tax lies outside
the conﬁdence interval.9
The second and third lines repeat the exercise using the diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach in the last two lines of table 3. As discussed above,
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences reduces any bias due to incorrect indexation but
increases bias due to misclassiﬁcation of workers. Using the unrestricted
sample, the point estimate indicates that about six-tenths of the worker
share of the tax is shifted to employers. The conﬁdence interval again in-
cludes full shifting to employers and excludes full shifting of the ﬁrm share
to workers. Thus diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences and simple diﬀerences tell simi-
lar stories although the range of the conﬁdence interval is somewhat lower
with diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences.
When we restrict the sample range, the conﬁdence interval using diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences becomes much sharper. The coeﬃcient (.45) is similar to that
obtained using the full sample but the estimate is much more precise. The
lower end of the conﬁdence interval is at the upper end of the range consistent
with market-clearing. The upper end is below the full shifting predicted by
the eﬃciency wage model unless workers put positive value on the increased
beneﬁts. The results strongly rule out the standard model without incentive
eﬀects.
Finally, the last two lines of the upper section of table 4 shift to measuring
real earnings changes using the GDP deﬂator although the groups, high
and low-earnings workers, continue to be deﬁned as before.10 With the
unrestricted sample, the results are uninformative. The conﬁdence interval
ranges between -3 and 3. With the restricted sample, the results are broadly
similar to those obtained with simple diﬀerences. We can reject full shifting
to workers but not to ﬁrms.
9The conﬁdence interval assumes that the error terms are homoskedastic and normally
distributed. Despite the fact that three observations are used to determine the year eﬀects
for control years and only one is used for the experimental years, the estimated standard
errors of the year eﬀects do not vary greatly across years so that the homoskedasticity
assumption is reasonable. Whether the normality assumption is reasonable is a matter of
taste.
10Unfortunately the period we are studying includes those rare years in which the GDP
deﬂator and the CPI diﬀer signiﬁcantly. The eﬃciency wage model suggests that the
wage should depend on the CPI while the market-clearing model suggests using the GDP
deﬂator and the hybrid model some combination of the two. In practice, using the
CPI to index income results in conﬁdence intervals that are so large as to be completely
uninformative.
215 Replication Using Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics
Several seminar participants suggested that it would be preferable to use the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics instead of the March CPS. The PSID has
three potential advantages. First, we can match the 1975 and 1976 earnings
of workers and thus have an additional control year. Second, since the survey
is designed to follow families over time, with only a modest amount of care,
we can be sure that errors in matching do not introduce measurement error
into year-to-year earnings changes. Third, we can examine hourly earnings
as well as annual earnings. On the other hand, because earnings data were
initially recorded only in bracketed form in the PSID, we cannot use the
1968 experiment. Moreover, the smaller sample size may introduce more
imprecision in the measurement of median earnings changes.
I replicated many of the approaches in table 3 and consistently found
that while the point estimates were consistently positive — increases in the
earnings base raised wages - the conﬁdence intervals were so large as to
render the exercise uninformative. Replicating the results in the ﬁrst part
of table 4 proved slightly more informative. The results are presented in the
lower panel of the table. Note that in contrast with the upper part of the
table where there were three experimental years and four control years, in
the lower panel, there are two experimental years and ﬁve control years.
Despite the diﬀerences in samples, the results in the lower panel are
similar to those in the upper panel albeit less precise. Using the base speci-
ﬁcation, the point estimate indicates that earnings rises by almost the entire
amount of the tax increase but the conﬁdence interval includes all econom-
ically interesting values. When we rely on diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences, the
point estimate falls, but we are able to rule out the conclusion that earnings
fall by the full amount of the tax increase. Restricted the sample to those
with $5000 of the cutoﬀs, gives even more precise diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimates which again rule out the earnings falling by the full tax increase.
Finally, using the hourly wage instead of annual earnings generates even
more imprecise results. Point estimates were generally positive but occasion-
ally negative. In only one case did the conﬁdence interval exclude at least
some points between wages rising by the full amount of the increase and
falling by the full amount. This is the case of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimate using the restricted sample. Again we reject the hypothesis that
wages fall by the full amount of the increase.11
11The scaling using hourly wages is somewhat arbitrary. This scaling presumes that
226 Discussion and Conclusion
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is to demonstrate
that it is possible to use the comparative statics of the models to distinguish
between competing models of wage determination. Wages and employment
undoubtedly respond diﬀerently to a variety of policy interventions under
standard competitive and eﬃciency-wage setting.
In fact, earlier studies of the incidence of payroll taxes could be construed
as tests of the competing models if they were able to distinguish between
the incidence of taxes and the incidence of beneﬁts. Thus Gruber’s (1997)
ﬁnding that the incidence of the Chilean payroll tax falls on workers tends
to support the competitive model. However, he emphasizes that he cannot
distinguish between the eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts. His results would be
c o n s i s t e n tw i t ha ne ﬀect of the wage on productivity or even the eﬃciency
wage model if workers valued the change in beneﬁts suﬃciently to oﬀset the
change in taxes.
As with most diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences studies, the results here are ulti-
mately based on a small number of observations. Yet the results are surpris-
ingly consistent across approaches. The earnings of high earners consistently
rise faster in years when the earnings base increases than in the comparisons
years. Moreover, in most speciﬁcations, this relative change is statistically
signiﬁcant implying that earnings rise in response to the tax increase. This
provides support for the eﬃciency wage model. and tends to contradict the
standard competitive model.
However, as noted in the theory section, there is really a range of models
between the standard competitive model and the eﬃciency wage model.
If wage increases raise worker productivity, then even though labor force
participation is inelastic, the supply of eﬀective labor units may be elastic.
If the supply of eﬀective labor units is suﬃciently elastic, the nominal 50/50
split of the tax between workers and ﬁrms may not require wages to adjust.
In general, the estimates in this paper are not suﬃciently precise to reject
this possibility. Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that productivity is
very responsive to wage increases but must be cautious in concluding that
this eﬀect is suﬃcient to prevent the labor market from clearing.
individuals work 2000 hours per year. If they worked fewer hours, the absolute values of
the coeﬃcient and endpoints of the conﬁdence interval would be higher. However, for
any reasonable scaling, the result excludes the full burden falling on workers.
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TABLE 1











1967 6,600 7,182 0.92 4.4
1968 7,800 7,664 1.02 4.4
1969 7,800 8,455 0.92 4.8
1970 7,800 8,966 0.87 4.8
1971* 7,800 9,399 0.83 5.2
1972* 9,000 10,202 0.88 5.2
1973 10,800 11,186 0.97 5.85
1974 13,200 11,863 1.11 5.85
1975 14,100 12,758 1.11 5.85
1976* 15,300 13,455 1.14 5.85
1977 16,500 14,626 1.13 5.85
1978 17,700 15,730 1.13 6.05
1979 22,900 17,014 1.35 6.13
1980 25,900 18,612 1.39 6.13
*Annual demographic supplement cannot be matched with prior year. 
Sources: Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, History of the Provisions
of Old Age Survivors and Disability and Health Insurance,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/HOP/hoptoc.htm, Oct. 26, 1999 and U.S. Census Bureau, “Full-
Time, Year-Round Workers (All Races) by Median Earnings and Sex: 1960 to 1998,”
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/p38.html, Nov. 10, 1999.27
TABLE 2
RELATION BETWEEN EX POST AND EX ANTE
MEASURES OF HIGH EARNINGS





Above Cut-Off In 1
st Year
No Yes No Yes No Yes
1979-80
No 97.6 26.5 95.6 19.8 94.3 15.5





No 97.0 18.9 96.4 20.0 94.3 14.8
Yes 3.0 81.1 3.6 80.0 5.7 85.2
1974-75
No 97.8 24.0 95.8 18.6 93.9 16.5





No 97.5 23.2 95.0 15.2 94.5 16.4





Differences in Earnings Increases 
First-Stage Estimates (high-earnings workers 1
st year)
Year 1968 1974 1979
1968 -234 - -
1970 -505 -569 -888
1974 - -259 -
1975 -661 -742 -1081
1977 -585 -659 -1034
1979 ---735
1980 -683 -803 -1190
Second-Stage Coefficients




















































Standard errors in parentheses. Controls: Age, sex, race, education, census “state”, married
spouse present, lives in an MSA and number of children under age 18.29
TABLE 4
Results from Combining Experiments
Estimated Fraction of Worker








































     (0.35)     
-0.36, 1.41
Differences-in-Differences
(Restricted sample) -
Hourly Wage
1.13
(0.56)
-0.32, 2.58